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Hard Cases for Autonomy, Respect,
and Professionalism in Medical Genetics*
Roger B. Dworkin
Case I
John, a 54-year-old man, who is at risk for Huntington's Disease (HD), is on the
waiting list to receive a heart transplant. John's age-adjusted risk of contracting
HD is 10%. The heart transplant center asks the genetic testing center to perform
presymptomatic testing to discover whether John will develop HD. If the test is
positive, the transplant center will remove John from the waiting list. If the testing
center refuses to test John, the transplant center may decide to remove him from
the list anyway.
What ought the testing center to do? What is to be said about the transplant cen-
ter's behavior?
Case 2
We are learning that many conditions not previously thought to be genetic, do
have a genetic basis, and that some persons have genetic predispositions to devel-
oping still other conditions. As presymptomatic, and especially prenatal diagnosis
become more common, difficult questions about how to respond to these condi-
tions will arise.
Suppose it becomes possible to prenatally diagnose alcoholism, homosexuality,
and a predisposition to schizophrenia and breast cancer.
1. Mr. and Mrs. A, distressed by the toll that alcoholism has taken on the fa-
milies of Mrs. A's father and brother, seek prenatal diagnosis to discover whether
their fetus will have the mutation that causes alcoholism.
* I am indebted to Kimberly Quaid, Ph.D. for calling case I to my attention and to Susan
H. Williams for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this article. A version of this
article was presented at a conference, "Hard Cases in Genethics," which was held in Mem-
phis, Tennessee, March 31 -April 4, 1999. I am grateful to the organizers of the conference
and to its participants for their helpful discussion of the cases and ideas considered in this
article.
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2. Mr. B. and Mr. C, who are in a committed, monogamous relationship, seek
the services of a fertility center to have a child through surrogate motherhood,
using semen provided by B or C.
a) The fertility center wants to insist as a condition of its participation that diag-
nosis be done at the earliest possible moment to assure that any baby born to B, C,
and the surrogate not be homosexual.
b) B and C want to insist that diagnosis be done at the earliest possible moment
to assure that any baby born to them and the surrogate will be homosexual.
3. Persons at risk for transmitting predispositions to schizophrenia or breast can-
cer seek prenatal diagnosis of the predispositions in their fetuses.
What are ethically appropriate responses to each of these situations?
Commentary
Both of these cases are designed to test the limits of certain articles of faith in
the genetic counseling community, to expose inconsistencies among those articles
of faith, and to explore an alternative approach to resolving issues of genetic ethics.
I have discussed elsewhere the genetic counseling profession's asserted commit-
ment to patient autonomy and nondirective counseling and its deviation from that
commitment when genetic testing of children is involved. I have suggested that
respect for all relevant individuals and close attention to professionalism will pro-
vide better solutions to ethical issues in genetics.' These cases are an effort to test
that suggestion in very difficult contexts and to see what solutions that approach
offers to concrete dilemmas.
Case I
At first blush this case seems to be about genetic discrimination. It raises the
discrimination question in starker, if less common, terms than the usual case about
whether to deny insurance or charge extra premiums to persons at risk for develop-
ing a genetic disease or to those who have been diagnosed as pre-symptomatic for
a genetic disease.
Organs are a very scarce resource. In the United States 10 patients die each day
while waiting to receive an organ transplant.2 As of December 18, 1998, 63,833
1 Roger B. Dworkin, -The Human Genome Project's Implications for Autonomy, Respect,
and Professionalism in Medical Genetics," in 7 Ann. Rev. of Law and Ethics/Jahrbuch fur
Recht und Ethik, pp. 115- 136; see also, Roger B. Dworkin,"Medical Law and Ethics in the
Post-Autonomy Age," in 68 Ind. L. J. 727 (1993).
2 http://sdsmarketplace.com/orgnfact.htm, crediting statistics to UNOS and TRANSWEB.
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persons were on waiting lists to receive donor organs.3 4,161 of these were await-
ing hearts. 4 Thus, the desire to transplant valuable organs to those persons who are
most likely to receive long-term benefit from the transplant is easy to understand.
How wasteful it would seem to transplant a heart to John only to have John be-
come symptomatic for HD within months of receiving the transplant. HD would
significantly shorten John's life. Before his death it would reduce the quality of his
life to the point where he could not recognize the benefit he was receiving from
the transplant or engage in the behavior required to protect his transplanted heart.
Moreover, transplanting a heart to John will mean denying that heart to another
patient who also needs the heart to survive. It is easy to understand the transplant
center's desire to use its scarce resources for patients who will receive the maxi-
mum benefit from them.
On the other hand, many patients with heart disease die from conditions unre-
lated to their heart disease. The transplant center is asking John to pay the price
of uneven medical progress, which can now predict whether John will develop
HD but cannot predict other maladies or events that may kill other patients. Ge-
netic diseases, like HD, are paradigmatic examples of immutable conditions over
which the affected person has no control. If equal treatment means anything, it
means that people should not be treated differently because of such conditions.
Moreover, requiring John to be tested not only would be to treat him worse than
persons who are not (or are not known to be) at risk for HD, but also would be
to treat him worse than other persons at risk for HD. Persons at risk are not or-
dinarily forced to be tested, and the majority of such persons choose not to be. 5
How can one justify forcing John to be tested based on his heart condition, a
condition that he may have developed despite his best efforts to pursue a heart-
healthy lifestyle?
The case is further complicated by two other facts: First, John's age adjusted risk
of developing HD is only 10%. One wonders whether at some point a risk becomes
too low for it to be considered, and, if so, whether 10% is that low. Second, the
transplant center may remove John from the list of potential recipients if the genet-
ic testing center refuses to test him as well as if his test is positive. Thus, the only
way to assure that John remains on the list is to perform the test and obtain a nega-
tive result. The transplant center has placed the testing center, as well as John, in a
real bind.
If John refuses to be tested, the testing center obviously cannot proceed to test
him. However, John may ask to be tested. He may decide that 10% is a low risk
3 http://www.giftoflife-sc.org/statistics.asp
4 Ibid.
5 See, David H. Smith, Kimberly A. Quaid, Roger B. Dworkin, Gregory P. Gramelspacher
Judith A. Granbois, Gail H. Vance. Early Warning: Cases and Ethical Guidance for Presymp-
tomatic Testing in Genetic Diseases, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1998 p. 30, and authorities cited therein.
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and that being tested offers him the best chance to receive a transplant. Would it be
appropriate for the testing center to refuse to test under these circumstances?
What at first appeared to be a question of discrimination is now revealed to be a
question about the limits of professional autonomy: To what extent may genetic
professionals refuse to provide services because they disapprove of the reason the
services are being sought?
The testing center may want to refuse to test John for at least two reasons: Cen-
ter personnel may be unwilling to allow the center to be manipulated by the trans-
plant center and to become the passive tool of someone else's social engineering.
Alternatively, the center may believe that testing should only be provided to per-
sons who have freely sought testing or who have sought testing for reasons the
center's personnel approve. These reasons would not justify refusing to test John.
Genetic professionals should be guided by professionalism and respect for indi-
viduals affected by the professionals' work. Nothing in the training or expertise of
a genetic professional qualifies him or her to pass judgment on the reasons that a
person seeks genetic testing. If the test were medically contraindicated, that would
be a different matter. A person who is not at risk for HD should not be tested to
allay irrational fears; it is appropriate for a testing facility to conserve its resources.
However, a person who is at risk should be able to obtain testing without having to
satisfy the nonmedical preferences of the facility and its personnel. John is entitled
to the center's expertise. Its professionals should counsel him about the psycholo-
gical risks of both positive and negative test results. It is even appropriate to advise
him whether to be tested in view of all the matters within the expertise of the pro-
fessionals. 6 But professionals know no more than anybody else about the intensely
personal calculus that will lead one person to prefer a transplant at the risk of ac-
quiring unwanted genetic knowledge and another to prefer genetic innocence and a
life shortened by the lack of a transplant.7 To impose nonexpert judgment on John
is simply the unjustified use of power. To do it claiming that it is for John's own
good is arrogance and hubris.
Imposing such a nonexpert judgment on John would also run afoul of the alleged
commitment to nondirective counseling. This is not surprising. The commitment
to nondirectiveness is often more honored in the breach than in the observance.
Genetic professionals are reluctant to advise other people whether to have children,
6 For the development of arguments supporting directive, rather than nondirective coun-
seling see, Ibid.., passim; Dworkin, 7 Ann. Rev. of Law and Ethics, op.cit. (fn. I).
7 This insight underlies the entire law of informed consent. "A medical doctor, being the
expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure he is prescribing, the risks of a decision
not to undergo the treatment, and the probability of a successful outcome of the treatment.
But once this information has been disclosed, that aspect of the doctor's expert function has
been performed. The weighing of these risks against the individual subjective fears and hopes
of the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment
reserved to the patient alone." Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
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but they are often willing to impose their other values on patients - refusing to per-
form presymptomatic diagnosis on children, for example. This apparent anomaly
merely reveals the humanness of genetic professionals and the bankruptcy of the
nondirectiveness principle. What John and every other patient needs and should be
entitled to is the professional expertise of the professional, nothing less, and, as this
case suggests, certainly nothing more.
This analysis, however, does not address the testing center's own interest in not
becoming the pawn of the transplant center. If the testing center disapproves of the
transplant center's policy, may it ethically refuse to test John? I think not. John is
innocent of any wrongdoing. It seems hard to justify denying him an important
benefit to make a point to the transplant center. Moreover, the wisdom and propri-
ety of the transplant center's policy are beyond the professional expertise of the
genetic testers. As citizens, testing center professionals may vote, lobby their legis-
lators, take out ads that criticize the transplant center, etc., but as professionals,
they must do what professionals do. Genetic testing professionals exist to do genet-
ic testing in cases where it is consented to and not medically contraindicated. To
put it another way, respect for John requires doing what John wants (serving his
interest in autonomy) unless matters within the professional expertise of the testers
suggest important reasons related to John's welfare or to the welfare of other iden-
tified or reasonably identifiable affected persons to refuse. Refusing to test John
because the center feels used by the transplant group is just another way of refus-
ing to test him because his reasons to be tested aren't good enough. As suggested
above, that is not acceptable.
The transplant center's policy is more difficult to evaluate. The policy is appar-
ently legal as doctors and organ procurement organizations may adopt any criteria
they think are appropriate in deciding which patients should be on the waiting lists
for organ transplants. 8 As discussed earlier, both the reasons for and against the
policy are easy enough to appreciate.
On balance, I think the transplant center's policy cannot be condemned. The
scarcity of organs and the physical and psychological requirements for dealing
with transplanted organs are matters within the professional expertise of trans-
plant professionals. Moreover, conditioning a transplant to John on his receiving
a negative HD test does not result in an organ being wasted. The organ will be
transplanted to somebody else. Any ethical analysis that overlooked the needs of
that potential recipient would be incomplete. Each affected individual is entitled
to equal respect, and John's status of being at risk for HD is no reason to prefer
John over another potential recipient. Therefore, while the transplant center's
8 Alexander M. Capron and Fred H. Cate, "Death and Organ Transplantation," in Michael
G. MacDonald / Robert M. Kaufman / Alexander M. Capron / Irwin M. Birnbaum (eds.), Trea-
tise on Health Care Law, New York/San Francisco: Matthew Bender, 1994 and Supps.
through Sept., 1998, p. 21 -77.
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policy is not ethically required, neither does it seem to be ethically inappropri-
ate.
Case 2
All prenatal diagnosis cases raise issues about abortion and the genetic testing of
children. This is because in the absence of prenatal treatment for a condition, only
two outcomes are possible after testing: the pregnancy will be terminated; or a
child whose status vis a vis some genetic disease or predisposition is known, will
be born. In addition, these cases raise questions of what constitutes a disease, of
designing children, and of the limits of parental autonomy.
Schizophrenia and breast cancer are diseases. Alcoholism is widely considered
to be a disease, although it is a disease whose symptoms can be completely con-
trolled by the adoption of behavior modification by the affected person. Homo-
sexuality is not a disease, but it is a widely stigmatized minority status. Predisposi-
tions are not diseases, although they may be disabilities for purposes of American
law.9 In a sense alcoholism and homosexuality are predispositions in children until
they reach the age at which they begin drinking or experience sexual responses.
It is easy to understand why potential parents would prefer to have a child who
will not be an alcoholic. Who would prefer a lifetime of struggle and misery for
their child and the child's potential family to a life free of the ravages of excessive
drink? Yet it does not follow that performing prenatal diagnosis of alcoholism is
appropriate. If alcoholism is a genetic disease, then, presumably, genetic profes-
sionals will have expertise in its incidence, onset, course, and prognosis, and they
will be familiar with appropriate professionals to whom persons with alcoholism
may be referred for treatment. It is appropriate for the genetic professionals to
bring all that information to bear in the genetic counseling process. It would be
inappropriate for them to fail to do so because their professional expertise is what
their patients are paying them for, and its use is the only justification for the exis-
tence of their profession. " ) If at the time when this issue arises, alcoholism has be-
come a readily treatable condition, the professionals should tell Mr. and Mrs. A
that and should counsel them to avoid testing the fetus if the risks of stigmatization
outweigh the burdens associated with the disease.
Mr. and Mrs. A will assert an autonomy interest in having their fetus tested. We
normally remit medical decision making for children to the children's parents, and
at first blush there is no reason to refuse to do that before the child is born. Indeed,
the case for parental, especially maternal, control is stronger before birth than after
9 The general question of the relationship of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 122i3 (Supp. iii 991) to genetic states is discussed in MarkA. Rothstein,
"Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with Disabilities Act," in 29
Hous. L. Rev. 23 (1992). See also, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) holding that per-
sons who have been infected with HIV, but who do not yet have AIDS, have a disability.
10 See, sources cited op. cit. (fn. 6).
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because of the need to involve the mother's body in any diagnostic or treatment
activity. Nonetheless, most commentators argue that presymptomatic diagnosis of
children (and fetuses) for genetic diseases is inappropriate unless a medical inter-
vention is possible if a positive diagnosis is made."1 I have argued against this po-
sition elsewhere,' 2 and I continue to believe that the substitution of professional
for parental judgment about presymptomatic testing is usually an unjustified impo-
sition of the inexpert personal views of persons who happen to be professionals.
In this case, no valid reason exists for refusing to test the fetus. Once the profes-
sionals have explained all the relevant information and engaged in directive coun-
seling by advising the A's not to have the fetus tested (if that is their professional
opinion), then the A's should remain free to make the ultimate decision. Otherwise,
a refusal to test will reflect the professionals' views about abortion, alcohol con-
sumption and abuse, how significant and expensive treatments must be before they
are too significant and expensive, etc. - all matters of social preference, not profes-
sional expertise.
The reason that the A's judgment should prevail over the professionals' is not
that parental autonomy must always outweigh other values. It is that in this case
the professionals have no more claim to wisdom than anybody else. Therefore,
there is no reason to deviate from our ordinary preference for parental decision
making. The normal reasons for that preference - parental wisdom exceeds the
child's; parents want what is best for their children; parental obligations to children
should be accompanied by some parental rights' 3 - are valid in the absence of evi-
dence that suggests something amiss in this case. Absent that, no justification for
preferring the judgment of strangers exists.
Does this preference for parental decision making apply in the homosexuality
context as well? Certainly, the effort by the fertility center to avoid the birth of a
homosexual child is unacceptable.' 4 At worst it represents an imposition of preju-
dice. At best it is a paternalistic effort to spare the as yet unconceived child the
negative effects of becoming a member of a stigmatized group. However, that can-
not be justified here, even if one is open to paternalism in some contexts, because
11 Lori B. Andrews/Jane E. Fullerton/Neil A. Holtznan/Arno Motulsky (eds.): Asses-
sing Genetic Risks: Implications for Health and Social Policy, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1994, 276-77; "The Genetic Testing of Children," Report of a Working
Party of the Clinical Genetics Society (UK). in 31 J. Med. Genetics 785 (1994); and other
sources cited in Dworkin, 7 Ann. Rev. of Law and Ethics op.cit. (fn. 1), p. 26 and fn. 23.
12 Dworkin, 7 Ann. Rev. of Law and Ethics op.cit. (fn. 1).
13 Ibid.. p. 28 and fn.31 and sources cited therein. The argument that parental rights should
accompany parental obligations is not strong in the case of selecting characteristics of a child
before birth as the discussion of the homosexuality case will make plain. See, infra. However,
the other arguments for deference to parents apply, and the absence of an additional argument
is no reason to deviate from the ordinary state of affairs.
14 See generally, Edward Stein, "Choosing the Sexual Orientation of Children," in 12
Bioethics 1 (1998).
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there is no professional basis for deciding that life as a homosexual is a net burden
to a potential child. Imagine the outrage that would greet a suggestion that fertility
services should only be made available to members of the dominant race to avoid
creating a child who will be stigmatized and discriminated against.15 The problem
here is the same.
It is harder to know how to respond to Mr. B's and Mr. C's efforts to guarantee
the birth of a homosexual child. Those who are committed to parental autonomy
will support their desire. Those, like me, who generally support parental control
because it seems likely to work out best most of the time, will begin with a predis-
position to do the same. Is this the best approach?
Parental autonomy is an inadequate basis for decision making. Every parental
decision affects the unborn (here unconceived) child, and a decision to predestine
the child to a particular style of life is a decision to deny autonomy to the child.
Why should progenitors be free to insist that their offspring have certain character-
istics?
16
The truth is that within limits parents do have the power to choose their chil-
dren's characteristics. Selecting a mate of one's own race guarantees that the child
will also be of the same race. Is it permissible to go farther than this "natural selec-
tion," to enlist help in achieving a desired characteristic? For example, is it accep-
table for a white couple that seeks artificial insemination by "donor" to insist that
the sperm provider be white? If we assume (as I think most people would) that the
answer is yes, then is it any less acceptable for a gay couple to insist that their child
be gay?
First, it is entirely possible that the assumption that insisting on same-race artifi-
cial insemination is acceptable may turn out after analysis to be wrong. Even if it
is correct, however, at least two differences between race and sexual orientation
may be relevant. First, race is different than sexual orientation in that race is imme-
diately apparent to a casual observer while sexual orientation (or the future sexual
orientation of a child) is not.' 7 Thus, potential parents and their family-to-be have
15 For a general discussion of selecting the race and sex of offspring see, Jonathan M. Ber-
kowitz and Jack W Snyder, "Racism and Sexism in Medically Assisted Conception," in 12
Bioethics 25 (1998); C. L Ten, "The Use of Reproductive Technologies in Selecting the Sex-
ual Orientation, the Race and the Sex of Children: A Comment on Stein and on Berkowitz
and Snyder," in 12 Bioethics 45 (1998).
16 One distinguished scholar has suggested that selecting offspring characteristics is a part
of procreative liberty, John A. Robertson, "Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics," in
76 B.U.L.Rev. 421 (1996), but there is an important difference between being allowed to
procreate and being helped to do so, and there is another important difference between being
allowed to procreate and being allowed to dictate the terms under which one will do so.
17 Berkowitz and Snyder make this point in the quite different context of arguing that par-
ents ahould not be allowed to insist that their children be of a race different from the parents.
They would insist upon, "reasonable phenotypic approximation." Berkowitz and Snyder, op.
cit. (fn. 15). pp. 35- 37.
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an extra interest in having a child who shares their race, an interest rooted in avoid-
ing exposure to prejudice. Individuals who are not themselves racists are not obli-
gated to volunteer to become martyrs in the war against racism. No extra prejudice
or new prejudice against the parents or the family unit will be caused by gay par-
ents having a heterosexual child.
Second, racial matching may be achieved almost effortlessly while sexual orien-
tation matching requires genetic testing. Is that difference significant? I think it is.
The fact that a person can achieve one questionable goal easily is no reason to fa-
cilitate his achieving other questionable goals that would require significant effort
and outside assistance to achieve. The inability to stop a person from doing one
thing does not suggest that we should facilitate that person's doing something simi-
lar. If assuring that their child will be gay is a deprivation of that child's autonomy,
a commitment to B's and C's autonomy cannot justify the action. My autonomy to
swing my fist ends where your nose begins.
But all sorts of parental decisions deprive parents' present and future offspring
of autonomy. We usually accept that for the reasons noted above. Is there any rea-
son not to follow the normal preference for parental decision making here? Nor-
mally, we assume that parents have a better sense of what is good for their child
than the child does. Here, of course, the child does not exist, but B and C also have
no claim to superior knowledge. This is not a case like a religious refusal of medi-
cal treatment case in which we are willing to defer to a parent's views of the rela-
tive weight of a child's health and the child's immortal soul. It seems hard to argue
that the child will be better off with a minority sexual orientation. The parents are
the ones who want this for their benefit, although they are likely to make an unper-
suasive argument that the child will be reared better if it is exactly the way the
parents want it to be. That argument, if taken seriously, would support almost any
child-designing agenda that any parents might formulate.
Another reason to defer to parents is that they are presumed to care more about
their child than anyone else does. Here there is no child to care about, and the par-
ents' motivations seem selfish.
Finally, parents have many obligations to their children; we usually think that
some rights should accompany those obligations. Here, however, as noted, there is
no child. B and C have no obligations. The question is whether they have the right
in advance to condition their obligations by dictating one of the potential child's
characteristics. Clearly, the answer should be no. The ability to refrain from having
a child does not imply a right to dictate the child's condition any more than a right
to remove life support from a patient would imply a right to do something short of
causing the patient's death, like beating him up. Moreover, parents' rights are
rights to control some aspects of their children's upbringing (religion, schooling,
etc.). They are not rights to have a certain kind of child. Parental obligations exist
regardless of whether the child is the way the parents would like it to be. Parents
who are disappointed by the birth of a child with a serious birth defect, may not
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abandon the child because they did not get what they wanted. Similarly, parents
should not be able to dictate what they want in advance. 8
Thus, the usual reasons to defer to parents do not exist. Given that, Mr. B and
Mr. C should not be able to dictate the sexual orientation of their child for two
reasons: First, there is a general presumption against designing children. This is
based on recognition of human ignorance about what characteristics to promote
and what undesired characteristics may accompany desirable ones and on a com-
mitment to the value of genetic diversity. Second, the intentional creation of a child
with a stigmatized characteristic that does not carry a clear compensating benefit is
an act of cruelty to a child. 19 This is not to say that it ought to be prohibited by the
law. The suggestion is only that the request by B and C is unethical, and that the
fertility center will be behaving ethically if it refuses to honor their request. To put
the matter another way, being heterosexual is not a disease, and therefore parents
ought not to insist that their children not be born with heterosexuality.
The same method of analysis can resolve the predisposition questions. Breast
cancer and schizophrenia are clearly diseases, and they are diseases whose onset
and course are less susceptible to control by the patient than alcoholism. Thus, if
the certainty of the condition, rather than a predisposition to it were at issue, the
parents would clearly be acting within ethical bounds to obtain prenatal diagnosis
and, if they decided to do so, to terminate the pregnancy. Does the fact that only a
predisposition exists change the answer?
In a sense, we are all predisposed to a fatal disease. When I use the term, "pre-
disposition," to refer to the conditions of the fetuses here, I am assuming that it will
be possible to determine that a particular fetus carries a mutation that significantly
increases its risk, after birth, of contracting schizophrenia or breast cancer as com-
pared to the background risk. Here, professionals understand the degrees of risk,
the nature of the diseases and their treatments, and the current state of research for
ultimate cures. Respect for their patients requires that they share that information
and their opinions based on it with the potential parents. As long as there is no
reason to doubt the parents' motives in wanting to spare their children from suffer-
18 Prospective parents are ethically permitted to try to avoid the birth of a child with a
serious genetic disease or birth defect. This is to avoid suffering caused by disease and, often,
to honor the values that underly a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. How-
ever, the opportunity to try to avoid the birth of a child with a birth defect does not imply
either a right to abandon a child with a defect if one is born despite the effort to avoid it, or
the right to select among nondisease states.
19 We need not resolve the question of whether being created with a stigmatized character-
istic is a net benefit or detriment to the child who did not exist at the time the decision was
being made. Only three situations are possible: No child will be born; a child with the stigma-
tized condition will be born; or a child without the stigmatized condition will be born. Less
cruelty will occur if a child without a stigmatized condition is born than if a child with such a
condition is born. If having a heterosexual child is unacceptable to B and C, they are, of
course, free to refrain from having a child at all.
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ing or the risk of suffering, the parents' preferences should be followed even if the
professionals disagree.
All of these cases suggest that focusing on the characteristics and limits of pro-
fessionalism and on respect for relevant individuals leads to sound results in the
genetic disease context. Unlike an autonomy-based analysis, this approach does
not prevent us from evaluating and limiting parents' conduct if the parents seek to
control a child's characteristics when the effect of doing so would be the preven-
tion of a normal characteristic or the creation of a disease state. This analysis has
implications for those who would suggest that deaf persons, dwarves, etc. have an
entitlement to insist on offspring who share their conditions.
Zusammenfassung
Der Beitrag verwendet schwierige Fdille, um an ihnen die Angemessenheit einer
Ethik der genetischen Beratung zu iiberpriifen, die auf die Ideen der Patientenauto-
nomie und der Vermeidung von Bevormundung gegrindet ist. Dabei stellt sich her-
aus, daB ein solcher Ansatz den Erwartungen, die an ihn zu richten sind, nicht ge-
recht wird. Es wird gezeigt, daB ein ethischer Ansatz, der auf Professionalismus
und den Respekt vor dem Individuum setzt, eher geeignet ist, in realen Fallen zu
befriedigenden Resultaten zu fihren.
In diesem Beitrag wird insbesondere ein Fall analysiert, in dem ein Mann, des-
sen Gene ein Risikopotential fir die Entwicklung von Huntington's Disease auf-
weisen, eine Herztransplantation benotigt. Anhand des Falles wird die Angemes-
senheit von Ansditzen erbrtert, die den Anspruch einer Person, die Huntington's
Disease entwickeln wird, auf eine Transplantation zurickweisen wiirden. Und es
wird untersucht, inwieweit Genetiker dazu geeignet sind, die Legitimitdit von
Griinden festzustellen, die Patienten haben m6gen, wenn sie um eine prisympto-
matische Diagnose nachsuchen. Dabei werden Faile m6glicher priinataler Diagno-
sen fir Alkoholismus, Homosexualitiit und Prdidispositionen fir Brustkrebs und
Schizophrenie er6rtert, um auf diese Weise die Grenzen elterlicher Autonomie zu
ermitteln.
Es zeigt sich dabei, daB eine Fokussierung auf Professionalismus und Respekt
zu einer besseren Behandlung fur die Patienten fihrt, zu mehr Interesse fur das
Wohlergehen von lebenden und zukunftigen Kindern und zu einem besseren
Schutz fur die realen Autonomie-Interessen der Patienten, als dieses die traditio-
nelle Betonung von Patientenautonomie und Nicht-Bevormundung zu leisten ver-
mag.

